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RETALIATION AND THE REASONABLE PERSON 
Sandra F. Sperino 
Abstract 
When a worker complains about discrimination, federal law is 
supposed to protect that worker from later retaliation. Recent scholarly 
attention focuses on how courts limit retaliation claims by narrowly 
framing the causation inquiry. A larger threat to retaliation law is 
developing in the lower courts. Courts are declaring a wide swath of 
conduct as insufficiently serious to constitute retaliation. 
Many courts hold that it is legal for an employer to threaten to fire a 
worker, to place the worker on administrative leave, or to negatively 
evaluate the worker because she complained about discriminatory 
conduct. Even if the worker has evidence that her complaint caused the 
negative consequence, some judges refuse to call the employer’s conduct 
legal retaliation.  
This growing body of retaliation harm jurisprudence is surprising. 
Under existing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a worker suffers an 
adverse action if the negative consequence would dissuade a reasonable 
person from complaining about discrimination. Yet, lower courts 
routinely dismiss cases by ruling that consequences such as threatened 
termination or negative evaluations would not dissuade a reasonable 
person from filing a discrimination complaint.  
In doing so, courts are making factual determinations about what 
reasonable people think. Using empirical evidence, this Article 
demonstrates that these factual determinations are incorrect. This Article 
then explores how structural and substantive features of retaliation law 
and judicial decision-making skew retaliation law in a narrow direction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Federal employment discrimination law relies on worker complaints 
for its enforcement. The law requires workers to report discrimination to 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or a state 
agency before filing suit.1 Court-created doctrines also require or 
encourage employees to complain about inappropriate discriminatory 
conduct.2  
The discrimination statutes ostensibly protect workers through anti-
retaliation provisions.3 To prevail on a retaliation claim, a person must 
show that she engaged in protected activity, that she suffered an adverse 
action, and that there was a causal connection between the activity and 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(1), (f)(1) (2012).  
 2. See infra Section V.B. 
 3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012); Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (2012); Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2012). 
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the consequence.4 Recent scholarly attention focuses on how courts limit 
retaliation claims by narrowly framing the causation inquiry.5 A larger 
threat to retaliation law is developing in the lower courts. Courts are 
declaring a wide swath of conduct as insufficiently serious to constitute 
retaliation. 
If an employer threatens to fire an employee, places her on 
administrative leave, or gives her a bad evaluation because she 
complained about discriminatory conduct, many courts will dismiss the 
employee’s retaliation claim.6 Even if the employee has evidence that her 
complaint caused the negative consequence, some courts refuse to call 
such conduct legal retaliation.  
This growing body of retaliation harm jurisprudence is surprising. 
Under existing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a worker suffers an 
adverse action if the negative consequence would dissuade a reasonable 
person from complaining about discrimination.7 Yet, lower courts 
routinely dismiss cases by ruling that certain consequences, such as 
threatened termination or negative evaluations, would not dissuade a 
reasonable person from filing a discrimination complaint.8  
In doing so, courts are making factual determinations about what 
reasonable people think. Using empirical evidence, this Article 
demonstrates that these factual determinations are incorrect.9 I asked 
study participants if facing certain negative consequences would dissuade 
them from complaining about discrimination. An overwhelming 
percentage of study participants perceived a wide range of negative 
consequences as likely to deter them from complaining about 
discrimination. These results held true for both men and women.  
The study results demonstrate that lower courts have set the harm 
threshold too high. Borrowing from past critiques of the reasonable 
person standard, it is tempting to conclude that such results merely reflect 
bias. However, combining an extensive review of the retaliation cases 
with the study results suggests that something else is happening in the 
retaliation context. 
                                                                                                                     
 4. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013); see also Crawford 
v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 274 (2009) (discussing 
opposition and participation conduct under Title VII). 
 5. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Rosenthal, A Lack of “Motivation,” or Sound Legal Reasoning? 
Why Most Courts Are Not Applying Either Price Waterhouse’s or the 1991 Civil Rights Act’s 
Motivating-Factor Analysis to Title VII Retaliation Claims in a Post-Gross World (but Should), 
64 ALA. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (2013). 
 6. See infra Part I. 
 7. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). 
 8. See, e.g., Brown v. SDH Educ. E. LLC, No. 3:12-cv-2961-TLW, 2014 WL 468974, at 
*6–7 (D.S.C. Feb. 4, 2014). 
 9. See infra Part II. 
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This Article explores the role of perceived precedent in shaping 
retaliation law. When courts rule that a particular action is not serious 
enough to trigger retaliation liability, the resulting decision appears as if 
the court is making the determination as a matter of law for all similar 
actions.10 Lower courts in subsequent cases are therefore often not 
making independent decisions about whether a particular action is 
harmful. Rather, they are following what they perceive to be precedent.  
In contrast, when courts rule that certain actions are serious enough to 
create liability, they often discuss the particular circumstances of the 
plaintiff or his workplace and why the negative consequences are serious 
in the particular context.11 Judges in subsequent cases do not as readily 
perceive these earlier cases as precedent because the earlier cases rely so 
heavily on the underlying facts of the cases to justify their conclusions. 
Additionally, current retaliation law contains two different strands: 
one that uses the harm standard to further the goals of retaliation law and 
another that uses harm doctrine to limit the scope of retaliation claims. 
The empirical research in this Article shows that these two strands are in 
tension with one another and may lead to different answers about whether 
particular actions should create liability.   
Shifting the focus away from bias allows for a fuller exploration of 
how structural and substantive features of discrimination law generally 
and retaliation law specifically push the law in a restrictive direction. In 
some ways, this turn away from bias as a central motivation mirrors a 
conceptual change in how we understand discrimination itself. In the 
early decades after the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (Title VII), courts and academics often described discrimination as 
resulting from bias or personal animus.12 While bias still exists, modern 
academic commentary often explores how structural features of the 
workplace and workplace decision-making lead to discrimination.13 In a 
similar vein, this Article explores how the structures of judicial decision-
making generally and in the specific context of retaliation lead to high 
harm thresholds. 
                                                                                                                     
 10. See infra Part IV.A. 
 11. See id. 
 12. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 14 n.67 (2006). 
 13. See, e.g., id. (describing and critiquing the structural turn); Martha Chamallas, Structuralist 
and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
2370 (1994) (exploring structuralist and cultural domination influences); Tristin K. Green, 
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment 
Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 95 (2003) (“[A] mounting body of evidence indicates 
that a number of social and structural changes in the workplace have affected the ways in which 
discrimination operates.”); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A 
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460 (2001) (“[S]econd generation manifestations 
of workplace bias are structural, relational, and situational.”). 
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Given that courts themselves were largely responsible for 
incentivizing employers to create internal complaint procedures and for 
encouraging employees to complain, courts have a special responsibility 
to correctly align the harm standard with retaliation law’s underlying 
goals. To do this, courts should do two things. First, courts should 
enshrine cautionary language within the retaliation harm doctrine that 
warns courts that summary judgment in the employer’s favor is typically 
inappropriate when the worker presents evidence of a negative 
consequence. Second, courts should clarify that any action that is more 
than de minimis meets the harm threshold as a matter of law.  
In a small subset of cases, courts may determine that the consequences 
the worker faced would typically be regarded as de minimis. In these 
instances, the worker would still have the opportunity to prove that the 
action was harmful in her circumstances. Assuming that the worker 
presents evidence supporting a material dispute of fact regarding whether 
the action was harmful in her particular case, summary judgment would 
be inappropriate on the harm element of the retaliation claim.  
Redescribing the harm inquiry in this way comports best with the 
underlying goals of retaliation law. If the harm threshold is pegged to the 
consequences that would dissuade a reasonable person from complaining, 
the courts should recognize as a matter of law that most negative 
consequences would dissuade a reasonable person. If the purpose of 
retaliation law is to encourage workers to complain about discrimination, 
then the law should protect workers who make a complaint.  
Part I of the Article begins with an in-depth discussion of harm 
thresholds in retaliation law. Part II provides the results of an empirical 
study, which shows that the reasonable person standard enunciated by a 
substantial number of courts is inconsistent with the views of reasonable 
people. Part III explores the major implications of the study results. Part 
IV discusses how perceived precedent pushes the law in a conservative 
direction and describes the complexities in the current standard, including 
two divergent strands within the retaliation harm doctrine. Finally, Part 
V proposes two structural changes to the way courts approach retaliation 
harm. 
I.  THE REASONABLE PERSON IN RETALIATION LAW 
In numerous cases, federal appellate and district courts hold that a 
worker’s failure to allege sufficient harm is fatal to establishing a 
retaliation claim. These cases hold that an employee cannot establish a 
cognizable retaliation claim, even if he alleged that his employer took the 
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 Threatening to fire the employee;14 
 Negatively evaluating the employee or making disciplinary 
write-ups;15 
 Threatening the employee with a suspension or disciplinary 
action;16 
 Placing the employee on disciplinary or administrative leave;17 
 Making a shift change;18 
 Removing the employee from his office;19 or  
 Falsely reporting poor performance.20 
 
Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) are the main federal statutes 
that prohibit employment discrimination.21 When taken together, these 
statutes prohibit employment discrimination against individuals that is 
based on their sex, race, color, national origin, religion, disability, or 
                                                                                                                     
 14. See, e.g., Hellman v. Weisberg, 360 F. App’x 776, 779 (9th Cir. 2009); Brown v. SDH 
Educ. E. LLC, No. 312-cv-2961-TLW, 2014 WL 468974, at *7 (D.S.C. Feb. 4, 2014); Gutierrez 
v. GEO Grp., No. 11-cv-02648-PAB-KLM, 2012 WL 2030024, at *3 (D. Colo. June 6, 2012); 
Jantz v. Emblem Health, No. 10 Civ. 6076 (PKC), 2012 WL 370297, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 
2012); Pugni v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, No. 05 Civ. 8026 (CM), 2007 WL 1087183, at *23 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2007). 
 15. See, e.g., Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, 452 F. App’x 3, 8 (1st Cir. 2011); Sconfienza v. 
Verizon Pa. Inc., 307 F. App’x 619, 622, 624 (3d Cir. 2008); Sesay-Harrell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of 
Homeless Servs., No. 12 Civ. 925(KPF), 2013 WL 6244158, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2013); 
Augustus v. Napolitano, No. 11-120-JJB, 2013 WL 530586, at *5 (M.D. La. Feb. 11, 2013); 
Wilson-Robinson v. Our Lady of the Lake Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 10-584, 2012 WL 5940912, 
at *5–7 (M.D. La. Nov. 27, 2012); Palmer-Williams v. Yale New Haven Hosp., Civ. No. 
3:08cv1526 (JBA), 2011 WL 1226022, at *10 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2011); Carmellino v. Dist. 20 
of N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 03 Civ. 5942 PKC, 2006 WL 2583019, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 
2006). 
 16. See, e.g., Littleton v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC, 568 F.3d 641, 644 (8th Cir. 2009); Ballard 
v. Donahoe, No. 2:11-cv-2576 JAM AC PS, 2014 WL 1286193, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2014); 
Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also Chang v. Safe Horizons, 
254 F. App’x 838, 839 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that oral reprimands were not sufficient). 
 17. See, e.g., McKneely v. Zachary Police Dep’t, No. 12-354-SDD-RLB, 2013 WL 
4585160, at *10–11 (M.D. La. Aug. 28, 2013); Muse v. Jazz Casino Co., No. 09-0066, 2010 WL 
2545278, at *3 (E.D. La. June 16, 2010). 
 18. See, e.g., Lushute v. La., Dep’t. of Social Servs., 479 F. App’x 553, 555 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(analyzing an action arising from the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) using a Title VII 
standard); McKneely, 2013 WL 4585160, at *10.  
 19. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Monguio v. Ohio State Univ., 499 F. App’x 455, 464 (6th Cir. 
2012). 
 20. See, e.g., Littleton, 568 F.3d at 644. 
 21. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012); 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012); Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012). 
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age.22 These statutes also contain anti-retaliation provisions.23 For 
example, Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an 
employee or job applicant because that individual “opposed any practice” 
made unlawful by Title VII or “made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in” a Title VII proceeding or investigation.24  
This Part first explores the origins of the reasonable person harm 
threshold in retaliation law. It then discusses how courts interpret the 
reasonable person standard in the retaliation context. It concludes with an 
overview of scholarly critiques of the reasonable person construct. 
A.  Adverse Actions 
Courts typically describe retaliation cases as requiring three elements. 
First, the worker must engage in activity that the statutes protect, such as 
complaining to the employer or an administrative agency about 
discrimination.25 Second, the worker must suffer a negative consequence, 
which the courts call an “adverse action.”26 Third, there must be a causal 
connection between the protected activity and the negative 
consequence.27  
Over time, the courts developed the concept of an adverse action to 
define how serious a negative consequence must be before it could 
potentially lead to liability for retaliation.28 The courts began to use the 
term “adverse action” or similar language to separate actions that would 
potentially lead to liability from those that would not.29  
In 2006, the Supreme Court decided Burlington Northern & Santa Fe 
Railway v. White,30 which resolved a circuit split regarding the meaning 
of the adverse action requirement in retaliation cases.31 Knowing the facts 
of the case is necessary to understanding some of the later problems with 
the retaliation harm threshold. 
                                                                                                                     
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (a primary operative provision of Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)–
(b) (same for ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (same for ADEA). 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 25. Adams v. City of Montgomery, 569 F. App’x 769, 773 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. This Section emphasizes the core elements of a retaliation claim. Some courts, 
however, articulate the test differently. See, e.g., Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1070–71 
(10th Cir. 2004) (using a modified McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) 
burden-shifting test to evaluate a retaliation claim). 
 28. See generally Shannon Vincent, Unbalanced Responses to Employers Getting Even: 
The Circuit Split over What Constitutes a Title VII-prohibited Retaliatory Adverse Employment 
Action, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 991 (2005) (analyzing the various adverse employment action 
standards). 
 29. See id. at 992–93. 
 30. 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
 31. Id. at 57. 
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Plaintiff Sheila White worked for Burlington Northern in its 
Tennessee Yard as a track laborer.32 Although Ms. White performed other 
tasks, her primary responsibility was to drive a forklift.33 In September of 
1997, Ms. White lodged an internal complaint that her immediate 
supervisor frequently told her that women should not work in his 
department, and he insulted her in front of her male coworkers.34 The 
company placed the supervisor on a ten-day suspension and required him 
to attend sexual harassment training.35 
Later that month, Burlington’s “roadmaster” removed Ms. White from 
her forklift responsibilities, instead assigning her other job duties within 
the track laborer’s job description.36 Ms. White filed a charge of 
discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that the company discriminated 
against her and retaliated against her after she made the discrimination 
complaint.37 Ms. White then alleged that the roadmaster started to closely 
monitor her daily activities and placed her under surveillance at work.38 
Ms. White filed another charge of discrimination based on the 
surveillance.39  
A few days later, Ms. White had a disagreement with another 
supervisor.40 The supervisor alleged that Ms. White had been 
insubordinate, and the roadmaster placed her on an unpaid suspension.41 
After an internal grievance procedure, the company determined that Ms. 
White had not been insubordinate and reinstated her with backpay for the 
thirty-seven days of her suspension.42  
Ms. White later filed claims in federal court alleging that her employer 
retaliated against her by changing her job responsibilities and suspending 
her without pay.43 A jury found in Ms. White’s favor on the retaliation 
claim and awarded her compensatory damages.44  
                                                                                                                     
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 58. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 59. 
 40. Id. at 58. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 58–59. 
 43. Id. at 59. Although the Supreme Court mentioned the increased supervision of Ms. 
White as the basis for one of her EEOC charges, it did not further discuss this aspect of her 
retaliation claim. See id. at 60–72. Ms. White also alleged that her supervisor discriminated 
against her based on her sex. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 791 (6th 
Cir. 2004). 
 44. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 59. The district court denied the defendant’s post-trial motions. 
A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the decision below on 
8
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 6 [2016], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss6/4
2015] RETALIATION AND THE REASONABLE PERSON 2039 
 
The Supreme Court took Ms. White’s case to determine the meaning 
of “discriminate[s] against” in the context of Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision, including the more specific issue of how much harm adverse 
actions must cause to constitute discrimination.45 The Court held that the 
anti-retaliation provisions cover those employer actions that “would have 
been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant.”46 The 
Court further indicated that “the employer’s actions must be harmful to 
the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making 
or supporting a charge of discrimination.”47  
The Court’s description of this standard did not end there. The Court 
emphasized that the harm to the employee must be material and that the 
Burlington decision is not meant to insulate employees against “petty 
slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners.”48  
The Court further explained that “[n]o one doubts that the term 
‘discriminate against’ refers to distinctions or differences in treatment 
that injure protected individuals.”49 The Court specifically rejected the 
idea that an adverse action required a negative impact on compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.50 It held that Congress 
omitted these terms from the retaliation provision and that this omission 
must reflect a lower harm threshold for retaliation claims than the one 
found in the statute’s discrimination provisions.51  
The Court also held that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provisions are not 
confined to actions relating to employment or occurring in the 
workplace.52 By way of example, the Court noted that the goals of the 
anti-retaliation provisions would not be met if employers could escape 
liability by filing false criminal charges against an employee who 
complained.53 Instead, the goal of Title VII’s retaliation provision is to 
provide unfettered access to the statutory remedial scheme.54 
 
                                                                                                                     
the retaliation claim; however, the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court’s 
decision regarding the retaliation issues. Id. The Sixth Circuit held that a retaliatory action must 
meet the level of an adverse employment action to be cognizable under Title VII, concluding that 
a suspension without pay and reallocating job responsibilities constituted adverse employment 
actions. White, 364 F.3d at 796, 803–04. 
 45. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 56–57 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 46. Id. at 57. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 68. 
 49. Id. at 59. 
 50. Id. at 61–62. 
 51. Id. at 62–63. 
 52. Id. at 63. 
 53. Id. at 63–64. 
 54. Id. at 64.  
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The reasonable person standard contemplated by the Court is that of 
an objectively reasonable person.55 However, the Court noted that in 
some circumstances the courts might alter the reasonable person standard 
to include the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s 
position.56 For example, a schedule change might be inconsequential to 
many workers but could dissuade a working mother from submitting a 
complaint.57 The Court emphasized that the objective standard was meant 
to eliminate a need for courts to interpret a plaintiff’s unusual, subjective 
feelings.58 
The Court found it difficult to fully articulate the types of actions that 
constitute retaliation.59 Rather, the Court indicated that the context of 
each particular case would matter: “The real social impact of workplace 
behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, 
expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple 
recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.”60 The Court 
continued by noting that, in some circumstances, changes in an 
employee’s work schedule or a supervisor’s exclusion of an employee 
from a weekly training lunch might be actionable.61 Importantly, the 
Court specifically stated that it did not want to provide a list of specific 
prohibited acts because of the contextual nature of the harm inquiry.62 
The way the Court applied its new standard to the facts of Ms. White’s 
case is important. The Court held that the change in Ms. White’s job 
duties was actionable because “[c]ommon sense suggests that one good 
way to discourage an employee such as [Ms.] White from bringing 
discrimination charges would be to insist that she spend more time 
performing the more arduous duties and less time performing those that 
are easier or more agreeable.”63 It then cited an EEOC Manual indicating 
that Title VII prohibited retaliatory work assignments.64 
But, in the following paragraph of the opinion, the Court indicated 
that reassignment of job duties is not always actionable by stating that 
“[w]hether a particular reassignment is materially adverse depends upon 
the circumstances of the particular case, and should be judged from the 
perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering 
                                                                                                                     
 55. Id. at 68–69. 
 56. Id. at 69. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 68–69. 
 59. Id. at 69. 
 60. Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 70–71. 
 64. Id. at 71. 
10
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 6 [2016], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss6/4
2015] RETALIATION AND THE REASONABLE PERSON 2041 
 
all the circumstances.”65 The Court noted that there was ample evidence 
in Ms. White’s case that the change in her job responsibilities would be 
materially adverse. This Article later explores how this particular 
paragraph in Burlington has been problematic in subsequent cases. 
In considering whether the rescinded suspension constituted an 
adverse action, the Court noted that a month without pay would deter 
most employees from filing a discrimination complaint.66 Although the 
Court noted Ms. White’s particular evidence and the jury’s conclusion in 
light of her evidence, the Court’s opinion strongly suggested that a 
month-long suspension without pay would always be serious enough to 
trigger protection under the retaliation provision.67 
In his concurrence, Justice Samuel Alito noted that following the 
majority’s interpretation of the statute would mean that “a retaliation 
claim must go to the jury if the employee creates a genuine issue on . . . 
[questions such as] whether the employee was given any more or less 
work than others, was subjected to any more or less supervision, or was 
treated in a somewhat less friendly manner because of his protected 
activity.”68 
B.  Post-Burlington 
After Burlington, lower courts began to apply the Supreme Court’s 
language to different kinds of retaliation cases. Lower courts generally 
agreed that terminations, pay reductions, and demotions are adverse 
actions.69 Outside of these categories, the courts often denied relief to 
employees, holding that the employee cannot prevail because he failed to 
establish an adverse action.  
In hundreds of subsequent cases, federal circuit and district courts 
construed the adverse action requirement narrowly. Courts routinely 
dismiss cases by concluding that workers did not suffer enough harm. As 
discussed earlier, courts dismiss cases when workers allege that 
employers subjected them to threatened termination; negative 
evaluations; disciplinary write-ups; threatened suspensions; disciplinary 
and administrative leave; shift changes; threatened criminal prosecution; 
removal from an office; threatened disciplinary action; and reports of 
poor performance.70 
                                                                                                                     
 65. Id. (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 66. Id. at 72. 
 67. See id. at 72–73. 
 68. Id. at 75 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 69. See, e.g., Murphy v. Ohio State Univ., 549 F. App’x 315, 321 (6th Cir. 2013) (ruling in 
context of FMLA but citing to Title VII’s retaliation standard). 
 70. See supra notes 14–20 and accompanying text. As discussed later, the case law is not 
completely uniform. 
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When employees allege that employers take more than one action 
against them, some courts divide the alleged actions and individually 
determine whether each action meets the materiality requirement.71 Some 
courts then determine that, even when combined, the alleged 
consequences do not meet the adverse action requirement.72 As one court 
colorfully stated: “[z]ero plus zero is zero.”73 
Once a court finds that a particular consequence is not an adverse 
action, subsequent courts often cite the earlier holding without exploring 
any possible contextual differences between the two cases. This outcome 
is especially puzzling in retaliation cases because the Supreme Court 
provided examples of the same conduct that would be cognizable in one 
context but not in another. The Court indicated that in some instances 
exclusion from lunch would meet the harm threshold, but in other 
circumstances it would not.74 The Court’s standard, while supposedly an 
objective one, also contemplates a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s 
circumstances. 
Courts assert numerous rationales for their holdings. They do not 
explain many of these rationales well, and courts often refer to more than 
one of the following reasons for denying relief to a plaintiff. One rationale 
is that the retaliation statutes require a showing of harm and that the 
negative consequence suffered by the employee is not an injury or harm.75 
Courts often combine this rationale with the second, related concern that 
retaliation law should not respond to trivial harms, petty slights, or minor 
annoyances.76 Another concern is that a lower harm threshold will 
unreasonably shield the employee from subsequent, appropriate 
discipline for misconduct.77  
II.  THE STUDY: THE IMPACT OF NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES 
This Article’s study used a paper survey to test how individuals 
perceived retaliation harms. The survey first instructed participants to 
imagine that they witnessed discrimination in the workplace. It then 
                                                                                                                     
 71. See, e.g., McKneely v. Zachary Police Dep’t, No. 12-354-SDD-RLB, 2013 WL 
4585160, at *10–12 (M.D. La. Aug. 28, 2013). 
 72. E.g., id. at *11. 
 73. Tepperwien v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 663 F.3d 556, 572 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Grp. Equip. Fin., Inc., 138 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 74. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69 (2006). 
 75. Littleton v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC, 568 F.3d 641, 644 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 76. See, e.g., Szeinbach v. Ohio State Univ., 493 F. App’x 690, 693 (6th Cir. 2012); Lushute 
v. La., Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 479 F. App’x 553, 555 (5th Cir. 2012); Wilson-Robinson v. Our Lady 
of the Lake Reg’l Med. Ctr, Inc., No. 10-584, 2012 WL 5940912, at *7 n.3 (M.D. La. Nov. 27, 
2012). 
 77. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Med. Univ. Hosp. Auth., No. 2:11-2028-RMG, 2013 WL 4041954, 
at *24 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2013); Rattigan v. Holder, 604 F. Supp. 2d 33, 49 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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asked the participants a series of ten questions about whether certain 
actions would dissuade them from submitting a complaint about the 
discrimination to an employer. The eleventh question asked participants 
to indicate which actions in the list the participant considered to be only 
minor annoyances or petty slights.  
The original hypothesis for this study was that the results would show 
that participants would define conduct that would dissuade a reasonable 
person from filing a complaint at a different level than that found in most 
court opinions. Another hypothesis was that study participants would 
disagree with courts’ characterizations about what constitutes a minor 
annoyance or petty slight in the workplace. 
More than half of the study participants stated that the following 
consequences would or might dissuade them from complaining about 
discrimination: (1) being threatened with termination, (2) receiving a paid 
seven-day suspension, (3) being moved to an office in another location, 
(4) facing social ostracism from coworkers, and (5) facing a change in 
job responsibilities with the same pay. Additionally, more than seventy-
five percent of the study participants thought that a negative evaluation 
placed in their file would or might dissuade them. These results stand in 
stark contrast to the reasonable person harm threshold enshrined in many 
court opinions. 
A.  Survey Design and Sample 
The study’s sample consisted of ninety-five law students at the 
University of Cincinnati College of Law. The age range for study 
participants was twenty-one years of age to forty-five years of age, and 
the median age was twenty-four years old. There were fifty-two men who 
completed the survey and forty-two women. One student declined to 
provide age and sex data. All participants responded to the eleven 
substantive inquiries on the survey instrument. 
The survey started by instructing each participant to imagine that he 
witnessed discrimination in the workplace. Next, the survey asked the 
participants a series of ten questions about whether certain actions would 
dissuade them from submitting a complaint about the discrimination to 
an employer. The survey asked participants about the following ten 
actions: 
 A coworker stares rudely every day for a week; 
 Being fired; 
 A negative evaluation in an employment file; 
 A supervisor threatened termination but did not 
immediately carry out the threat; 
13
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 A paid seven-day suspension; 
 An office move to another location; 
 A demotion; 
 Criticism from a supervisor about work performance 
during a meeting attended by coworkers; 
 Social ostracism by coworkers; and 
 A change in job responsibilities with the same pay. 
For each action, the survey participant could answer yes, no, maybe, 
or do not know. The last question asked the survey participants to indicate 
which of the above-listed actions the participant would consider to be 
only minor annoyances or petty slights in the workplace. The participant 
could circle as many items from the list as the participant thought 
qualified as a minor annoyance or petty slight. The “minor annoyances” 
or “petty slights” language mirrors the standard courts apply when 
determining whether a plaintiff meets the required harm threshold. 
B.  Survey Results and How They Differ from Court Opinions 
The study results show a strong consensus about what actions would 
dissuade a reasonable person from filing a complaint. More than ninety 
percent of the study participants thought that termination would or might 
dissuade them from filing a complaint. About eighty percent thought that 
a negative evaluation in their employment file or a demotion would or 
might dissuade them. More than half of the study participants indicated 
that the following consequences would or might dissuaded them from 
filing a complaint: threatened termination, a paid seven-day suspension, 
an office move to another location, social ostracism by coworkers, or a 
change in job responsibilities with the same pay. 
There were only two potential job consequences that a majority of 
participants thought would be unlikely to prevent them from filing a 
complaint: a coworker staring rudely every day for a week and criticism 
from a supervisor about work performance during a meeting attended by 
coworkers. However, a sizable portion of the study participants still 
thought these actions would dissuade them from filing a complaint, with 
slightly more than seventeen percent indicating that stares from a 
coworker would or might dissuade them and more than forty-one percent 
indicating that criticism from a supervisor would or might dissuade them. 
The study results show that study participants viewed the most 
harmful consequence as termination, followed in order of seriousness by 
demotion, a negative evaluation in an employment file, threatened 
termination, a change in job responsibilities with the same pay, an office 
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move to another location, a paid seven-day suspension, and social 
ostracism by coworkers. Participants rated criticism from a supervisor 
about work performance during a meeting with coworkers and a 
coworker staring rudely every day for a week as the least serious. 
This data shows that the courts are correct in holding that termination 
and demotion are likely to deter a person from filing a discrimination 
complaint. More than ninety percent of participants thought termination 
would or might dissuade them, and more than eighty-three percent 
thought that a demotion would or might dissuade them.  
Notably, eighty percent responded that a negative evaluation would or 
might dissuade them. Recall that many courts hold that a negative 
evaluation is not an adverse action because it does not result in any harm 
to the employee.78 Additionally, more than sixty-eight percent of study 
participants ranked a threatened termination as likely to dissuade. A long 
line of cases, however, hold that a threatened termination would not 
dissuade a reasonable person from filing a complaint.79 Thus, the most 
important takeaway from this data is how significantly it differs from 
most written judicial opinions.  
Chart 1 provides the number and percentage of study participants who 
marked that a particular negative consequence would or might dissuade 
them from filing a complaint. The chart shows, in descending order, the 
actions that participants viewed as most harmful to least harmful.  
 
Chart 1. Percentage of Participants Who Would Not or Might Not 
Complain if Faced with Consequence 
 
Negative Consequence Percentage of Participants Who 
Would or Might Be Dissuaded 
Being fired 90.53%
Demotion 83.16%
A negative evaluation in an 
employment file 80%
Supervisor threatened termination but 




A change in job responsibilities with 
the same pay 62.11%
Office move to another location 55.79%
Paid seven-day suspension 53.68%
Social ostracism by coworkers 50.53%
Criticism from a supervisor about work 




A coworker stares rudely every day 
for a week 17.89%
                                                                                                                     
 78. E.g., sources cited supra note 15.  
 79. E.g., sources cited supra note 14.  
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In most categories, significant differences did not exist based on 
whether the response was from a female or male participant. Chart 2 
provides the data based on the sex of the participant. 
 
Chart 2. Percentage of Participants Who Would Not or Might Not 
Complain if Faced with Consequence, Differentiated by Sex 
 
Negative Consequence Percentage of Participants Who 
Would or Might Be Dissuaded 
(Male/Female) 









termination but did not 
immediately carry out the threat
63.46% (male) 
73.81% (female)
A change in job responsibilities 
with the same pay 63.46% (male) 
59.52% (female)
Office move to another location 65.38% (male)
45.24% (female)
Paid seven-day suspension 53.85% (male)
52.38% (female)
Social ostracism by coworkers 57.69% (male)
42.86% (female)
Criticism from a supervisor about 
work performance during a 
meeting attended by coworkers 
40.38% (male) 
40.48% (female)
A coworker stares rudely every 




In many categories, men and women reported nearly identical views 
of what negative consequences would or might dissuade them from 
complaining. Furthermore, for many actions where there was some 
overall difference between male and female participants, a higher 
percentage of male participants reported that the negative consequence 
would dissuade them from complaining. Two data points are especially 
interesting: both an office move and social ostracism were far more likely 
to dissuade men in the study from complaining than women. 
Chart 2 only included participants who stated that the negative 
consequence would or might dissuade them from complaining and 
excluded those who were uncertain about their reaction. In some 
categories, a higher percentage of women than men answered that they 
did not know whether the negative consequence would dissuade them 
from complaining. For example, when responding to whether an office 
move would dissuade a complaint, only two of the fifty-two male 
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respondents answered “do not know,” while five of the forty-two female 
respondents answered “do not know.” 
This data conflicts with the harm threshold expressed in many judicial 
opinions.80 The data also demonstrates that any claim that a high 
retaliation harm threshold somehow reflects a male view of retaliation is 
likely wrong. 
C.  Suggestions for Future Research 
Researchers should conduct future studies to determine whether 
others can replicate this study’s results with a larger sample size and non-
student participants. It is possible that law students possess knowledge or 
beliefs that differ from those possessed by non-students or from students 
in other disciplines. For example, some studies suggest that students are 
likely to overestimate both their willingness to complain about workplace 
problems and their participation in altruistic behavior.81 Other studies 
show that people answering surveys are likely to overestimate their 
willingness to stand up to discriminatory conduct.82 It also is possible that 
law students as a group feel less economically vulnerable than workers 
and that law students’ training in professional responsibility makes them 
more attuned to the importance of raising complaints about illegal 
activity. Therefore, it is possible that results from this Article’s study 
overestimate the likelihood that the person would complain. Future 
research could also determine whether adjustments to the provided 
discrimination hypothetical would change participants’ willingness to 
complain. This Article’s study instructed participants to imagine that they 
had witnessed discrimination against a coworker but did not provide 
additional details about the discriminatory act. It would be interesting to 
know whether changes in the prompt would alter participants’ reactions. 
Adjustments to the prompt could include indicating the severity of the 
discrimination and indicating the basis of the discriminatory act (such as 
race, religion, or sex). Future studies could also evaluate whether workers 
are more likely to complain about discrimination if it happens to them or 
to others. Although this Article’s study focused on discrimination to 
others, workers may be more motivated to complain about discrimination 
happening to them. Further research is necessary to determine whether 
the target of the discrimination affects the harm threshold.  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 80. See supra Section I.B. 
 81. See Robert A. Prentice, Beyond Temporal Explanations of Corporate Crime, 1 VA. J. 
CRIM. L. 397, 417–18 (2013). 
 82. See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-
Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 894–95 (2008). 
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Other studies might also explore ways to reduce the possibility of 
demand effects.83 A demand effect is when the study prompt might signal 
that the researchers desire a particular outcome.84 In this Article’s study, 
participants might perceive that the right thing to do if they witness 
discrimination in the workplace is to report it. Some study participants 
may have felt obligated to claim that they would not be dissuaded from 
complaining about discrimination, even if they might be dissuaded in a 
real life scenario. In an actual work environment, a worker may be able 
to hide the fact that he witnessed discrimination, or the worker may think 
that others will complain to stop the behavior.  
Other research could also interrogate this study’s underlying question 
using alternate methodologies, such as qualitative interviewing or 
allowing study participants to witness a taped or live performance of 
actors reenacting the discriminatory act.85 While a change in 
methodology might triangulate the results and perhaps provide greater 
nuance, most study-based methodologies are limited in that they do not 
provide the full context of real-world retaliation, where workers may 
have ongoing relationships with the person that the employer is 
discriminating against and others in the workplace.  
The survey instrument also did not take into account the possibility of 
ambiguity in the underlying act of discrimination. It would be interesting 
to know whether workers perceive the harm threshold differently if they 
are less certain about whether the underlying conduct occurred or whether 
it was discriminatory. Future projects might also consider how 
uncertainty about the likelihood of a retaliatory consequence affects 
results. This Article’s study asked participants to respond to concrete 
consequences that the participants “knew” would occur. In the real world, 
workers often do not know the consequences of complaining; rather, they 
assume the risk of unknown consequences. 
D.  A Supplement to the Survey: Triangulating the Data 
The study’s results show differences in the way that courts and law 
students perceive the seriousness of workplace consequences. But even 
prior to this study, courts had access to other data that suggested that 
narrow judicial views of harm were not in line with how others would 
                                                                                                                     
 83. See Rachel Croson, Why and How to Experiment: Methodologies from Experimental 
Economics, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 921, 940 (defining a demand effect as “when a subject acts in a 
particular way to please the experimenter”). 
 84. Id. 
 85. See, e.g., Barbara A. Gutek et al., The Utility of the Reasonable Woman Legal Standard 
in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Cases: A Multimethod, Multistudy Examination, 5 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 596, 603 (1999), available at http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/law/5/3/5 
96.pdf. 
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view the retaliation standard. This Section explores ways to supplement 
the survey results with existing data points. This data comes from three 
different places: jury verdicts, contrary judicial opinions, and academic 
research. 
In many adverse action cases, courts grant summary judgment on 
behalf of the employer.86 The few reported decisions involving jury 
decisions suggest that courts are setting the adverse action standard 
higher than some juries would. In some cases, a trial court submits a case 
to a jury that rules in favor of the worker, only to have that determination 
overturned on appeal or questioned on post-trial motions.87 These cases 
provide an opportunity to understand what a jury concluded on the 
adverse action prong. 
In one case, a jury found for the plaintiff on a retaliation claim and 
awarded $500,000 in punitive damages.88 The district court granted the 
employer’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the 
retaliation claim, and the federal appellate court affirmed the trial court’s 
decision.89 The appellate court found that the actions taken against the 
employee included three investigations to determine whether the plaintiff 
engaged in misconduct, a counseling statement that was later rescinded, 
a never-completed threat to terminate the plaintiff, and stares and 
negative comments from others.90  
Despite the jury’s verdict, the appellate court rejected the claim that 
each of the above actions was adverse.91 The appellate court held that 
investigating an employee’s conduct does not produce any injury or harm 
and that such conduct is trivial and akin to a “petty slight[]” or “minor 
annoyance[].”92 The court also concluded that empty verbal threats do not 
produce injury.93 Thus, the jury verdict in favor of the worker contradicts 
the findings of the appellate court. 
In another case, a worker recorded a conversation in which a 
supervisor threatened to terminate him for complaining to the EEOC 
about discrimination.94 There was evidence that the supervisor told the 
worker: “You aren’t going to work here until you get it reversed.”95 The 
                                                                                                                     
 86. See, e.g., supra notes 14–20 and accompanying text. 
 87. See, e.g., Miller v. City of Ithaca, 914 F. Supp. 2d 242, 249–50 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(granting a new trial on an adverse action issue). 
 88. Tepperwien v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 663 F.3d 556, 566 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 89. Id. at 566, 574. 
 90. Id. at 568–71. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. at 569–70 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 
(2006)). 
 93. Id. at 571. 
 94. Chapin v. Fort-Rohr Motors, Inc., 621 F.3d 673, 675–76 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 95. Id. at 676. 
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worker alleged that “it” referred to the charge submitted to the EEOC.96 
There was some evidence that after the conversation, the supervisor acted 
as if the employee was not fired and that he sent a letter to the employee 
asking him to return to work.97 The employee filed a retaliation claim 
under Title VII.98 The jury found for the worker on this claim, awarding 
him $100,000 in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive 
damages.99 The trial court denied the employer’s motion for judgment as 
a matter of law.100  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the jury 
verdict.101 Even though the court acknowledged some prior cases that 
recognized that a singular threat of termination might be enough to create 
a cognizable claim, the court cryptically noted that the district court did 
not consider that argument, and the appellate court declined to consider 
it.102 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit held that the worker failed to 
establish an adverse action.103  
As described in Section I.B, many federal courts grant summary 
judgment to employers in cases where workers allege that employers 
retaliated against them through actions such as poor evaluations, shift 
changes, and threatened terminations.104 These courts hold, as a matter of 
law, that the alleged actions do not constitute adverse actions, a 
determination based on whether the action would dissuade a reasonable 
person from filing a discrimination complaint. However, some courts do 
not grant summary judgment in similar circumstances.  
Part I contained a list of actions that courts hold are not adverse actions 
for retaliation claims. Considering that same list, it is possible to find 
cases in which courts hold the exact opposite—that each of the following 
consequences constitutes an adverse action: 
 
 Unrealized threat to terminate employee;105 
 Negative evaluations and disciplinary write-ups;106 
                                                                                                                     
 96. See id. at 675. 
 97. Id. at 677. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. This amount exceeds the damages caps under Title VII and would be subject to them. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 681. 
 102. See id. at 681, n.2. 
 103. Id. at 681. 
 104. See supra Section I.B. 
 105. See, e.g., Maron v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 508 F. App’x 226, 230–31 (4th 
Cir. 2013); Eldredge v. City of St. Paul, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1036 (D. Minn. 2011); E.E.O.C. 
v. Collegeville/Imagineering, No. CV-05-3033-PHX-DGC, 2007 WL 2051448, at *8 (D. Ariz. 
July 16, 2007).  
 106. See, e.g., Bixby v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 10 C 405, 2012 WL 832889, at 
*13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2012). Courts have held that a written warning or letter of counseling may 
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 Threat of suspension or disciplinary action;107  
 Placement on disciplinary or administrative leave;108 
 A shift change;109 
 An office move to another location;110 
 False report of poor performance.111 
 
Indeed, even within the same circuit, some court of appeals panels will 
hold that a certain action does not constitute an adverse action, while 
another panel will hold that it does. For example, in one case the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that reprimands are adverse 
employment actions.112 The Second Circuit reasoned that 
a letter of reprimand would deter a reasonable employee 
from exercising his FMLA rights. A formal reprimand 
issued by an employer is not a “petty slight,” “minor 
annoyance,” or “trivial” punishment; it can reduce an 
employee’s likelihood of receiving future bonuses, raises, 
and promotions, and it may lead the employee to believe 
(correctly or not) that his job is in jeopardy.113 
However, in another Second Circuit case, the court held that reprimands 
are not adverse employment actions.114 This panel indicated that such 
reprimands are merely petty slights and minor annoyances.115  
 
                                                                                                                     
rise to the level of an adverse employment action “if it affects the likelihood that the plaintiff will 
be terminated, undermines the plaintiff’s current position, or affects the plaintiff’s future 
employment opportunities.” Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1137 (10th Cir. 
2005); see also Roberts v. Roadway Express, 149 F.3d 1098, 1104 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
the written warnings constituted adverse employment actions, where “the record indicate[d] that 
the more warnings an employee received, the more likely he or she was to be terminated for a 
further infraction”). 
 107. See, e.g., Rattigan v. Holder, 604 F. Supp. 2d 33, 52–53 (D.D.C. 2009); O’Neal v. State 
Univ. of N.Y., No. 01–CV–7802, 2006 WL 3246935, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2006) (informing 
an employee that she was the subject of a disciplinary investigation was a material adverse action). 
 108. See, e.g., Killen v. Nw. Human Servs., Inc., No. 06-4100, 2007 WL 2684541, at *7 
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2007).  
 109. See, e.g., Taylor v. Roche, 196 F. App’x 799, 803 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that a refusal 
to grant a shift change is an adverse action). 
 110. See, e.g., Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996) (indicating that “actions 
like moving the person from a spacious, brightly lit office to a dingy closet” would constitute an 
adverse action). 
 111. See, e.g., Williams v. W.D. Sports, N.M., Inc., 497 F.3d 1079, 1087, 1090–91 (10th Cir. 
2007). 
 112. Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 164–65 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 113. Id. at 165.  
 114. Leifer v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 391 F. App’x 32, 35 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 115. Id.  
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There are also cases in which courts hold that a combination of some 
of these consequences constitutes an adverse action.116 In one case, the 
court found that an adverse action existed when the worker complained 
about inappropriate conduct and subsequently experienced delayed 
paychecks, denial of personal time, criticism of her work performance, 
and a shift change.117  
In some of these cases, the courts articulate why the alleged action 
might constitute an adverse action. One trial court reasoned that negative 
evaluations constitute adverse employment actions because they “can 
serve to have a chilling effect on an employee’s decision whether to 
engage in statutorily protected activity.”118 Another court reasoned that 
“[p]oor evaluations and letters of reprimand seem plainly to qualify” as 
adverse actions.119 In cases where the employer threatens discipline but 
does not carry it out, courts reason that this may deter employees from 
filing discrimination complaints, even if future harm never 
materializes.120 The fear of future harm is itself a deterrent. 
These results complement academic research regarding retaliation. 
The research shows that only a small percentage of people who 
experience harassment in the workplace formally report it to their 
employer.121 Workers are reluctant to complain about discrimination 
because they fear being labeled a troublemaker and being subjected to 
adverse consequences.122  
III.  IMPLICATIONS AND THE REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD 
The study results in this Article provide key insights about the 
retaliation harm threshold. The most important insight relates to the 
accuracy of the lower courts’ factual determinations that negative 
consequences, such as threatened termination or negative evaluations, 
would not dissuade reasonable people from complaining. These 
determinations are likely incorrect. The current retaliation harm threshold 
                                                                                                                     
 116. See, e.g., Alvarado v. Fed. Express Corp., 384 F. App’x 585, 589 (9th Cir. 2010); Davis 
v. City of Springfield, No. 03-3007, 2008 WL 361025, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2008) (denying an 
employer’s post-trial motions regarding whether denial of a transfer was an adverse action). 
 117. Alvarado, 384 F. App’x at 589. 
 118. Bixby v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 10 C 405, 2012 WL 832889, at *13 (N.D. 
Ill. Mar. 8, 2012). 
 119. Ashby v. Shinseki, No. 2:11-1050-RMG-BHH, 2012 WL 6772175, at *7 (D.S.C. Dec. 
12, 2012). 
 120. See, e.g., Rattigan v. Holder, 604 F. Supp. 2d 33, 52–53 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[W]hether an 
action is ‘materially adverse’ is determined by whether it holds a deterrent prospect of harm, and 
not by whether the harm comes to pass or whether any effects are felt in the present.”). 
 121. Brake & Grossman, supra note 82, at 896. 
 122. See id. at 873; see also L. Camille Hébert, Why Don’t “Reasonable Women” Complain 
About Sexual Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711, 712 (2007). 
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is too high to accomplish one of the goals the courts created it for—to 
provide a remedy whenever an employer takes an action that would 
dissuade a reasonable person from complaining about discrimination. 
The study results also provide a basis for challenging the applicability 
of traditional critiques of the reasonable person standard in the retaliation 
context. Drawing on past critiques of the reasonable person standard, it 
might seem plausible that the current case law reflects a male view of the 
workplace. Others might claim that the case law enshrines a majority 
view about retaliation harm but fails to reflect the views of certain 
subgroups of people. This Article’s empirical research calls both of these 
ideas into question. 
For decades, scholars have criticized procedural and substantive 
standards that require courts to evaluate facts through the lens of a 
reasonable person or a reasonable juror.123 These scholars criticize the 
reasonable person standard as having no fixed meaning and as being 
merely a vehicle for judicial discretion.124 They have called the standard 
“vague,”125 and one scholar noted that the standard only makes sense “if 
it is not taken too seriously.”126 
Some critiques stem from the standard’s origins as a reasonable man 
standard. Scholars criticize the semantic change from reasonable man to 
reasonable person as masking underlying male preferences that continue 
to define the standard.127 In the sexual harassment context, scholars 
criticize the reasonable person standard for enshrining the viewpoint of a 
reasonable man and not that of a reasonable woman.128 Also in this 
context, scholars have questioned whether courts should ever evaluate 
                                                                                                                     
 123. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 445, 455–56 (1997); Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, 
Objectivity, and the Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 EMORY L.J. 151, 198 (1994); Nancy S. 
Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual 
Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1177–78 (1990); Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, 
and the Reasonable Woman, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 769, 769; Ann C. McGinley, Reasonable Men?, 
45 CONN. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2012); Mayo Moran, The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual 
Biography in Comparative Perspective, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2010). 
 124. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 123, at 456 (discussing the difference between reason 
as the hallmark of the reasonable person and reason as “something like sensible, ordinary, 
moderate, or average”); Moran, supra note 123, at 1234.  
 125. E.g., Bernstein, supra note 123, at 464. 
 126. George Rutherglen, Sexual Harassment: Ideology or Law?, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
487, 496 (1995). 
 127. Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard 
in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1404 (1992); McGinley, supra note 123, at 
5; see also Martha Chamallas, Gaining Some Perspective in Tort Law: A New Take on Third-
Party Criminal Attack Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1351, 1357–58 (2010) (discussing 
semantic changes in tort law). 
 128. See Moran, supra note 123, at 1250.  
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harm that women experience differently under a reasonable person 
standard or whether a gender-specific reasonable woman standard is 
more appropriate.129  
The reasonable woman standard draws critiques as artificially 
constructing a unitary woman and as being insufficiently attentive to the 
experiences of people of color. 130 When male judges apply a reasonable 
woman standard, they may only pay “lip service” to the woman’s 
perspective and actually apply the judge’s own perspective to the 
particular problem.131 Additionally, even if one wanted to undertake a 
reasonable person inquiry that accounts for relevant protected traits, 
defining the reasonable person across a broad spectrum of race, sex, 
disability, age, and religion is difficult. 
Given these problems, the reasonable person standard often allows 
courts to apply their own “common sense” notions about what constitutes 
harm. These notions may be far different from what the normal female 
worker would think of as sexual harassment.132 Using the reasonable 
person standard suggests broad consensus on the appropriate standard for 
sexual harassment, even when no consensus exists.133 These critiques 
have been especially boisterous in the employment discrimination 
context, where a reasonable person standard defines when employees 
suffer enough harm to present a cognizable claim of workplace 
harassment or retaliation.134 
Scholars also often critique the standard as centered on a reasonable 
white man and not representing the interests of women and people of 
color.135 In the summary judgment context, one widely cited study 
showed that while the Supreme Court Justices’ views of a videotaped 
encounter with police comported with the views of a substantial number 
of people, identifiable groups of people viewed the videotaped evidence 
differently.136  
 
                                                                                                                     
 129. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 123, at 479–82. 
 130. E.g., id. at 473; Dolkart, supra note 123, at 206; Angela P. Harris, Race and 
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 588–89 (1990) (criticizing feminist 
theory for being essentialist); Maria L. Ontiveros, Three Perspectives on Workplace Harassment 
of Women of Color, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 817, 824–27 (2010) (critiquing harassment law). 
 131. Dolkart, supra note 123, at 200. 
 132. Ehrenreich, supra note 123, at 1206. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See sources cited supra note 123.  
 135. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 123, at 473; Dolkart, supra note 123, at 206; Ontiveros, 
supra note 130, at 824–27; Harris, supra note 130, at 582–83; David Schultz, From Reasonable 
Man to Unreasonable Victim?: Assessing Harris v. Forklift Systems and Shifting Standard of 
Proof and Perspective in Title VII Sexual Harassment Law, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 717, 717–20 
(1993) (summarizing critiques).  
 136. See generally Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are 
You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 
837, 848–79 (2009).  
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This Article’s study results show that the courts’ retaliation harm 
threshold cases do not present two of the common flaws associated with 
the reasonable person construct. As discussed throughout this Section, 
scholars critique the reasonable person standard because although it 
represents a majority view, it fails to capture the views of other 
identifiable groups of people. This Article shows that the reasonable 
person standard created by courts in the retaliation context fails to reflect 
the views of most reasonable people.  
In the sexual harassment context, scholars argue that the standard 
represents a male view. This Article’s study shows that men and women 
have strikingly similar views of retaliation harm.137 This is not a case 
where male judges are creating a harm standard that reflects the views of 
men. Rather, many courts are creating a standard that contradicts what 
most reasonable workers, whether male or female, would perceive as 
harmful.  
IV.  THE TURN AWAY FROM BIAS 
If bias is operating in the retaliation context, it is demonstrably 
different than the bias theorized by two of the dominant accounts 
discussed above.138 The results from this Article’s study, when combined 
with a review of the relevant court opinions, suggest two other 
explanations for the resulting case law: norms of judicial decision-
making and a complex and internally inconsistent harm doctrine.  
When judges write opinions advocating a high harm threshold, they 
often issue broad opinions that appear to hold, as a matter of law, that a 
particular action is never serious enough to create liability. In contrast, 
court opinions that find that a particular action might be cognizable tend 
to discuss the particular circumstances of the plaintiff and read as if the 
court perceives the remaining question as one of fact. Thus, the high harm 
threshold cases appear to be precedent for subsequent cases, while the 
cases supporting a lower threshold do not.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 137. See Section II.B. 
 138. It is possible that federal judges, as a group, view workplace harms differently than a 
reasonable worker. See Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination: A Matter of Perspective Rather 
Than Intent, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 657, 675 (2003). Federal district and appellate court 
judges possess greater job security than the majority of workers. See Thomas C. Grey, The 
Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (1984). Their income level is also higher 
than most workers. Michael J. Frank, Judge Not, Lest Yee Be Judged Unworthy of a Pay Raise: 
An Examination of the Federal Judiciary Salary “Crisis,” 87 MARQ. L. REV. 55, 81 n.155 (2003). 
They also work in an atypical environment, surrounded by many employees whom they 
personally hired. Article III judges are not subjected to a typical annual review process. See id. at 
108 & n.308. These judges have higher levels of education than the typical worker. Further, they 
understand, at least to some degree, the protections afforded under federal discrimination law. 
These facts may account for some of the disconnect in retaliation law. 
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Additionally, some of the high harm threshold cases appear to be cases 
where the court is actually concerned about whether the worker can 
establish causation. The court often rules for the employer on both the 
adverse action element and the causation element. The adverse action 
doctrine seemingly serves as a proxy argument for the court’s real 
concern about causation. 
Judicially constructed retaliation doctrines unnecessarily complicate 
the harm question. The doctrine is difficult to navigate, especially 
because it invokes a reasonable person construct that is unlike the 
reasonable person inquiry used in other types of cases. This Article’s 
survey research also reveals an internal tension within the Supreme 
Court’s description of retaliation harm.  
This move away from bias as the sole driver of outcomes mirrors a 
similar ongoing change in understanding discrimination itself. Early 
descriptions of discrimination often relied heavily on explicit animus.139 
Discrimination happened because supervisors disliked people with 
certain traits or felt that they did not belong in the workplace. Later work 
added the idea of implicit bias.140 
Some recent scholarship, however, has focused on the structural turn 
in discrimination.141 The remainder of this Article discusses how the 
structure and substance of retaliation law itself contributes to a 
jurisprudence that favors a higher harm threshold, even when the 
articulated standard for defining harm seems to point to a lower harm 
requirement. 
This Part does not argue that some judges are not biased against 
retaliation claims. Rather, it argues that many judges are not imposing 
their own viewpoints on retaliation law. They are, in a formalist way, 
trying to apply law they believe governs the claims. This Part argues that 
the way courts approach the adverse action requirement plays a 
significant role in shaping the law in a conservative direction.  
A.  The Problem of Perceived Precedent 
Some readers may ask themselves how a judge could credibly claim 
that an employee is not harmed if she receives a negative evaluation or if 
her supervisor threatens to fire her. Even without this Article’s survey 
                                                                                                                     
 139. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 321 (1987). 
 140. See, e.g., id. at 327–28; see also generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good 
Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 
VA. L. REV. 1893 (2009) (exploring the law’s ability to affect implicit bias). 
 141. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 12, at 1–4; Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as 
Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 850 (2007); 
Green, supra note 13, at 138; Sturm, supra note 13, at 459–60. 
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data, it seems to be common sense that threats of termination or negative 
evaluations would affect an employee’s willingness to complain.  
But, this question assumes that courts are actually conducting an 
inquiry into what the harm threshold should be when they issue opinions. 
This is not happening in all cases. In many instances, court opinions 
reflect little independent analysis of whether a particular action would 
dissuade a reasonable person from complaining. Many trial and appellate 
courts are not asking how a reasonable person might think about a 
particular kind of harm. 
Rather, their opinions cite prior cases that appear to hold that 
particular actions are not adverse actions. I call this phenomenon 
“perceived precedent.” This phenomenon occurs when a lower court or 
appellate court perceives a prior decision as determining as a matter of 
law that certain actions are not cognizable. Consequently, subsequent 
courts see no reason to revisit the harm inquiry and may feel compelled 
to reach the same result as the prior case. Even in instances where the 
prior case law is not technically precedent, the court follows what it 
perceives to be the majority view on whether a particular form of conduct 
constitutes an adverse action. 
In one case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
a grant of summary judgment for the employer on an employee’s 
retaliation claim.142 The court opined that reprimands and “the mere 
threat of termination do[] not constitute an adverse employment 
action.”143 In later cases, trial courts read the Ninth Circuit opinion as 
stating that such conduct cannot constitute an adverse action.144  
In another case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held 
that a wide swath of conduct does not constitute an adverse action, 
including issuing a disciplinary warning for reporting late to work, 
denying the plaintiff time off from work and overtime, denying the 
plaintiff a shift change, and assigning the plaintiff more difficult tasks 
than coworkers.145 The court engaged in very little discussion about why 
these events either separately or together do not constitute an adverse 
action.146 The decision includes no discussion of the worker’s individual 
circumstances, even though the Fifth Circuit cited Burlington.147 
Nonetheless, a subsequent district court cited the Fifth Circuit opinion to 
                                                                                                                     
 142. Hellman v. Weisberg, 360 F. App’x 776, 779 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See, e.g., Bogner v. R&B Sys., Inc., No. CV-10-193-JLQ, 2011 WL 1832750, at 
*7 (E.D. Wash. May 12, 2011); Campbell-Thomson v. Cox Commc’ns, No. CV-08-1656-PHX-
GMS, 2010 WL 1814844, at *6 (D. Ariz. May 5, 2010); Yee v. Solis, No. C-08-4259 MMC, 2010 
WL 1655816, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2010). 
 145. Hart v. Life Care Ctr. of Plano, 243 F. App’x 816, 818 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 146. See id. 
 147. Id. 
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justify its holding that assigning more arduous work is not an adverse 
employment action.148 
Appellate courts often make strong pronouncements that certain 
actions do not constitute an adverse action.149 In subsequent cases, courts 
then cite the earlier decision for the broad proposition that the actions are 
not adverse actions.150 In some cases, the original case provides some 
discussion of the plaintiff’s circumstances, but these subjective 
circumstances do not make it into later summaries of the case. This 
especially happens through string cites, where one court cites several 
prior cases simply by summarizing the holding in an explanatory 
parenthetical following the citation. It is easy to understand how the 
nuances of a case can become lost when a subsequent court reduces its 
facts to a parenthetical. 
Over time, these opinions have developed into a body of case law that 
appears to be precedent requiring subsequent lower courts to reach a 
particular result, without any independent reasoning or consideration of 
any subjective aspects of the particular case. Other opinions have 
developed into what appears to be a majority view of whether, as a matter 
of law, certain actions should be adverse actions. While this “majority 
view” is not technically binding on courts, it does have significant 
persuasive power. 
Holdings that favor a higher harm threshold often read as binding 
authority because courts frame them as questions of law. In contrast, 
cases favoring a lower harm threshold read as ad hoc determinations 
based on the facts of the case.  
When courts deny summary judgment motions on the adverse action 
element, their opinions often read as if they are not binding on future 
                                                                                                                     
 148. Belcher v. Fluor Enters., Inc., 4:10-CV-3475, 2013 WL 499858, at *6, *12 (S.D. Tex. 
Feb. 8, 2013). 
 149. See, e.g., Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1108 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that the denial of a transfer can only be an adverse action if the transfer would have 
resulted in higher pay or benefits and that isolated name calling is not actionable); see also Fiero 
v. CSG Sys., Inc., 759 F.3d 874, 880 n.2 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding that placement on a performance 
improvement plan is not an adverse action); Smith v. City of Fort Pierce, 565 F. App’x 774, 778 
(11th Cir. 2014) (“As an initial matter, glaring, slamming a door in an employee’s face, inquiring 
into retirement plans, commenting that an employee is not a team player, blaming an employee 
for failed union negotiations, or harboring concerns over an employee’s dependability and 
trustworthiness are not actions that would dissuade a reasonable worker from making or 
supporting a charge of discrimination.”). 
 150. For example, subsequent cases cite to Brown for the proposition that certain actions 
cannot constitute adverse actions. Rohler v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 523 F. App’x 418, 421 (7th Cir. 
2013); Fabiyi v. McDonald’s Corp., 11 CV 8085, 2014 WL 985415, *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2014); 
Selan v. Valley View Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 365-U, 10 CV 7223, 2013 WL 146415, *6 n.7 (N.D. 
Ill. Jan. 14, 2013) (indicating that “[t]hose claims are thus clearly not adverse employment actions 
and will not be discussed further”).  
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cases. This is because many of these opinions note the plaintiff’s 
individual circumstances as one of the factors militating against summary 
judgment and also note how a reasonable person would perceive 
particular actions in the plaintiff’s particular workplace.151 If a 
subsequent court read this type of case, it would be easy for that later 
court to distinguish the new case from the prior case by contrasting the 
two factual scenarios. 
Some of these low harm threshold cases assume, without deciding, 
that the alleged action constitutes an adverse action and then focus on 
other elements of the retaliation claim. For example, in one case where a 
referral for discipline constituted an adverse action, the court’s opinion 
noted that the defendant largely challenged other elements of the 
retaliation claim.152 These cases would not count as precedent in a 
subsequent case. 
When a jury finds that a certain action is or is not an adverse action, 
that finding is not precedent. Even though jury verdicts provide a body of 
law that might contain information about the harm threshold, it is easy 
for courts to disregard this body of law in subsequent cases. It is not 
precedent; rather, it is the application of law to a particular set of 
circumstances. 
The higher harm threshold cases tend to focus only on the action taken 
and make broad statements about that action in a vacuum. These cases 
read as if they are pronouncements of law, and subsequent courts often 
seem to perceive them that way. If just a handful of appellate decisions 
hold that a particular action is not serious enough to create liability for 
retaliation, this handful of decisions can have a large impact in 
subsequent cases. Courts in these subsequent cases may feel that they are 
unable to change the existing law.  
Perceived precedent is problematic for several reasons. First, as 
discussed throughout this Article, it is likely wrong regarding the severity 
of harm needed to dissuade a reasonable person from complaining. This 
Article’s study and jury verdicts show that workers perceive threatened 
terminations, negative evaluations, and other actions as being harmful 
and likely to dissuade them from complaining about discrimination.  
                                                                                                                     
 151. See, e.g., Maron v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 508 F. App’x 226, 231 (4th Cir. 
2013); Rattigan v. Holder, 604 F. Supp. 2d 33, 54 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Here, there is evidence that 
the security investigation posed an objective threat to plaintiff’s career, such that a jury could find 
that the investigation was ‘materially adverse.’ . . . [A]n allegation that an FBI agent was a security 
risk, particularly an agent ‘in such a sensitive assignment as Riyadh,’ is a ‘very serious allegation’ 
with ‘potentially devastating effects’ on that agent’s career.”). Not all lower threshold cases rely 
heavily on the worker’s circumstances. See, e.g., Bixby v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 10 
C 405, 2012 WL 832889, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2012).  
 152. Widomski v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Orange, 933 F. Supp. 2d 534, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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But more importantly, the high harm threshold cases disregard 
Burlington. In Burlington, the Supreme Court provided examples of 
when an action might be severe enough to cross the harm threshold.153 
The Court provided a specific example—whether not receiving an 
invitation to lunch would be cognizable.154 The Court indicated that 
normally a supervisor excluding an employee from lunch would not be 
actionable.155 But, the Court continued: “[T]o retaliate by excluding an 
employee from a weekly training lunch that contributes significantly to 
the employee’s professional advancement might well deter a reasonable 
employee from complaining about discrimination.”156 Thus, anything as 
serious as or more serious than exclusion from a training lunch is 
potentially cognizable under Burlington. 
In situations where the kind of negative consequence does not seem 
to be serious in the run of the mill case, the Supreme Court explicitly 
indicated that the particular circumstances of the plaintiff or her 
workplace might change the normal outcome. The reasonable person 
contemplated by the Court is an objectively reasonable person in the 
plaintiff’s position.157 The standard expressly incorporates subjective 
aspects of the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s workplace.158  
As the Court specifically stated, “Context matters.”159 It elaborated: 
The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends 
on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, 
expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured 
by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts 
performed. A schedule change in an employee’s work 
schedule may make little difference to many workers, but 
may matter enormously to a young mother with school-age 
children. . . . Hence, a legal standard that speaks in general 
terms rather than specific prohibited acts is preferable, for an 
act that would be immaterial in some situations is material 
in others.160 
In case after case, appellate courts determine that a certain action does 
not constitute an adverse action without mentioning any of the individual 
circumstances of the plaintiff or his workplace. While purporting to apply 
                                                                                                                     
 153. 548 U.S. 53, 67–68 (2006). 
 154. Id. at 69. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 68–69. 
 158. Id. at 69. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998) and 
Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Burlington, courts also ignore a significant portion of the opinion and 
consequently are not following the applicable law. As discussed below, 
the confusing Burlington opinion has led to inconsistent case law in lower 
courts. The perceived precedent ignores this inconsistency.  
It would be a major advance in retaliation harm jurisprudence for 
courts to understand that very few decisions are binding precedent in 
subsequent cases. In most cases, it is incorrect to make broad, categorical 
claims that certain actions can never lead to liability. Litigants arguing 
for a lower harm threshold may need to educate courts about the 
perceived precedent problem. 
B.  Alternate Holdings and Proxy Arguments 
Similarly, alternate holdings push adverse action law in a conservative 
direction. In many cases where a court rules that a certain action is not an 
adverse action, the case does not rest solely on this ground.161 For 
example, the court will hold that a particular action is not an adverse 
action and that the plaintiff failed to establish a causal connection 
between protected activity and the negative consequence.162 
Courts in many adverse action cases seem concerned about whether 
the worker can establish causation—the required link between the 
protected activity and the adverse action. Professor Deborah Brake has 
argued that courts have unnecessarily construed the protected activity 
element of retaliation cases narrowly in cases where the real concern 
appears to be causation.163 The same phenomenon happens in adverse 
action cases. 
This pressure may occur because many courts are unhappy with 
causation jurisprudence. In many circuits, a worker can establish the 
required causal connection by showing a temporal connection between 
her protected activity and the negative consequence.164 For example, if a 
worker complains about discrimination and then two months later she 
receives a bad evaluation, some courts will hold that the worker’s claim 
should survive summary judgment on the causation element. The short 
time span between the complaint and the bad evaluation suggests that the 
prior complaint may have motivated the bad evaluation.165 
Some courts are uncomfortable with causation law because they 
believe it improperly insulates the worker from legitimate discipline after 
                                                                                                                     
 161. See, e.g., Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1107–08 (7th Cir. 
2012). 
 162. See, e.g., id. 
 163. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89 IND. L.J. 115, 155 (2014). 
 164. See, e.g., Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 525–26 (6th Cir. 2008); 
Grier v. Snow, 206 F. App’x 866, 869 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 165. See, e.g., Mickey, 516 F.3d at 527–28. 
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he complains about discrimination.166 Some of them use adverse action 
arguments as proxies for the causation question. Others use the adverse 
action argument to bolster the conclusion they already reached on 
causation. If a court is uncomfortable with the causation analysis, it is 
easier to rule in favor of the employer by limiting the reach of the adverse 
action prong, which some courts view as a question of law. In contrast, 
questions of fact often exist about the causation element, making it more 
difficult to dispose of causation issues at the summary judgment stage.167 
This places unnecessary pressure on the adverse action element, 
making the substantive standard more onerous than it should be to 
accomplish its underlying goals. The reasoning for the adverse action 
element often feels unsatisfactory because it is often a proxy argument 
for causation concerns.  
C.  Inherent Tension Within Retaliation Doctrine 
This Article’s empirical research demonstrates that the current 
adverse action standard is problematic because it asks courts to navigate 
two separate, and sometimes contradictory, strands of the Burlington 
decision. In Burlington, the Court explained that adverse actions are 
“employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a 
reasonable employee or job applicant.”168 The Court also indicated that 
“the employer’s actions must be harmful to the point that they could well 
dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination.”169 Additionally, the reasonable person standard is not 
meant to insulate employees against “petty slights, minor annoyances, 
and simple lack of good manners.”170  
According to Burlington, the adverse action requirement encompasses 
multiple inquiries: one question of what actions would dissuade a 
reasonable person and another about whether the action rises above the 
level of petty slights and minor annoyances.171 The Court’s description 
of the adverse action requirement suggested that both of these inquiries 
should yield the same answer. In other words, if a person perceives an 
action as only being a petty slight, then that person should also think that 
the same action would not dissuade a reasonable person from 
complaining about discrimination.  
This Article’s survey results show that an overwhelming number of 
participants answered these two questions differently when considering 
                                                                                                                     
 166. See, e.g., Chivers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 641 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 167. See, e.g., Smith v. Koch Foods of Miss., LLC, No. 3:09CV668 DPJ–FKB, 2011 WL 
2415336 at *2 (S.D. Miss. 2011). 
 168. 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). 
 169. Id. at 57. 
 170. Id. at 68. 
 171. Id. 
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the same underlying conduct. The study asked participants to first 
determine whether ten actions would dissuade them from complaining 
about discrimination against a coworker. The eleventh question asked the 
survey participants to indicate which of those ten actions the participant 
would consider to be only minor annoyances or petty slights. The 
participant could circle as many items from the list as the participant 
thought met the criteria of being a minor annoyance or petty slight.  
Only twenty-two of the ninety-five participants—less than twenty-
four percent—answered questions 1 through 10 in a way that was 
consistent with their answer to question 11. In other words, more than 
seventy-five percent of study participants did not get the same answers 
when asked to apply the two legal standards to the same conduct. For 
example, although social ostracism by coworkers was enough to dissuade 
a participant from complaining, the same participant could still consider 
social ostracism to only be a petty slight. These results indicate that the 
two ideas—willingness to complain and perceptions of annoyance or 
pettiness—are not necessarily consistent. 
The participants’ answers point to a possible tension in the underlying 
law. When courts consider whether an adverse action would dissuade a 
reasonable person and whether it is more than a petty slight, these two 
questions do not necessarily lead to the same result. However, the current 
doctrine does not recognize this tension. 
D.  An Inconsistent History 
As discussed in the prior Section, existing doctrine contains two 
strands: one that uses the harm doctrine to limit claims and the other that 
uses it to further the underlying goals of retaliation law. The current 
doctrine does not inform courts on how to navigate between these 
potentially contradictory views of the retaliation standard. Nor does it 
adequately explain how the reasonable person standard furthers the 
underlying goals of retaliation law. If examined carefully, it is 
questionable whether the substantive standard even does so. Faced with 
a convoluted standard with unclear goals, it is understandable that courts 
would refuse to navigate the complexity and favor bright-line rules. 
This is especially true when considering that the harm standard is not 
the only complex question facing courts in many retaliation cases. 
Although this Article has isolated the applicable law and highlighted the 
relevant issues, this is not how cases look when courts evaluate them. For 
example, many retaliation cases also raise discrimination claims. If an 
employee complained about discrimination by her employer and then 
faced a negative consequence, the worker could raise both a 
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Over time, discrimination law has become extraordinarily complex. It 
consists of a series of complicated frameworks172 that each contains 
numerous subparts.173 The subparts themselves are often complicated, 
and some are even the basis of circuit splits.174 By the time courts analyze 
the retaliation case, they have often already navigated a complex set of 
analytical frameworks for the discrimination claim.175 
Even standing alone, the retaliation harm doctrine is not simple. It 
combines three different sets of legal terminology with further 
explanatory language added by the Supreme Court.176 Looking at how 
retaliation harm jurisprudence developed over time shows that some of 
this history pulls the law toward a narrow construction of the adverse 
action element. 
The language of Title VII’s retaliation provisions makes it unlawful 
for an employer to “discriminate” against an employee “because he has 
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this 
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing 
under this subchapter.”177 The ADEA and ADA contain similar 
language.178 However, these statutes’ retaliation provisions do not use the 
words “adverse action” or “adverse employment action.”179 
The words “adverse action” or “adverse employment action” 
originally developed in the discrimination context.180 Courts used these 
words to summarize all of the potential actions that might result in 
liability for discrimination under Title VII. Rather than list that Title VII 
prohibits terminations, failures to promote, failures to hire, pay 
differentials, and other actions based on a protected trait, the courts used 
the shorthand reference of “adverse action” or “adverse employment 
action.”181 
 
                                                                                                                     
 172. See generally Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
69, 70–81 (2011). 
 173. See id. at 118–21 (arguing that the use of judicially created frameworks in employment 
discrimination law results in a faulty conceptualization of discrimination). 
 174. Id. at 120, 123. 
 175. This inquiry can become even more complex when the worker brings state law claims. 
States often have laws that prohibit discrimination and retaliation. Although many state laws 
follow federal law, some require a different analysis. In these instances, courts apply multiple 
tests to evaluate one set of facts. 
 176. See infra notes 177–86 and accompanying text. 
 177. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) (2012).  
 178. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2012); ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2012).  
 179. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3 (2012); id. § 12203(a). 
 180. See Vincent, supra note 28, at 991–92. 
 181. See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that adverse 
action is defined broadly).  
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In discrimination law, the purpose of the adverse action element then 
changed. Courts began using the words “adverse action” or similar 
language as words of limitation.182 These words came to denote a 
distinction between those actions for which the law would provide a 
remedy and those for which it would not.183 
Courts then adopted the adverse action language in the retaliation 
context. In Burlington, the Supreme Court held that the adverse action 
concept in Title VII’s retaliation provision was much broader than 
adverse action in the discrimination context.184 Yet, the Court continued 
to use the words “adverse action” to describe harm required in the 
retaliation context. Burlington used the phrase “adverse action” but never 
discussed how the term related to the actual text of the retaliation 
provision itself, even though the doctrine the court articulated varied from 
how most courts defined this term prior to Burlington.185  
The way the Court described the adverse action inquiry suggested at 
least two different functions of the element. The Court explained the 
element as limiting the reach of retaliation law by denying a remedy to 
workers who faced only petty slights.186 But, the provision also tried to 
connect harm doctrine to the broader goals of retaliation law generally by 
trying to determine what actions would deter a reasonable worker from 
complaining about discrimination. As discussed in the prior Section, the 
two functions sometimes point in different directions. It is easy to 
understand how a court that perceives the words “adverse action” as 
being words of limitation would interpret the term conservatively. 
However, there are additional layers of complexity. The statute uses 
the word “discriminate” to describe what employers cannot do,187 and the 
courts use the words “adverse action” to describe when the statute 
provides a remedy.188 In Burlington, the Court described the term adverse 
action as incorporating the concept of a reasonable person.189 The Court 
then imbued the reasonable person concept with its own meaning.190 
Thus, courts interpreting the harm doctrine are navigating three different 
sets of terminology: the word “discriminate” used in the statute, the term 
“adverse action” created by the courts and interpreted differently over 
time, and the term “reasonable person.”  
                                                                                                                     
 182. See supra Section I.A. 
 183. See, e.g., Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1107–08 (7th Cir. 
2012). 
 184. 548 U.S. 53, 70–71 (2006). 
 185. Id. at 57. 
 186. Id. at 69. 
 187. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3 (2012). 
 188. See, e.g., Burlington, 548 U.S. at 57. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
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On top of this is the Supreme Court’s interpretive gloss, which fails to 
describe how these three terms fit together or how the reasonable person 
standard supports the underlying goals of retaliation law. It is easy to see 
how lower courts, when faced with this complexity, would produce case 
law that is poorly reasoned. 
In a sense, the courts’ difficulty with the reasonable person standard 
in retaliation cases highlights an inherent problem in reasonable person 
doctrine. The law generally uses the words “reasonable person” in many 
different contexts, from contract law to criminal law to tort law.191 Yet, 
the courts have never reconciled what exactly the reasonable person test 
is supposed to accomplish in each circumstance.192  
To make matters worse in the retaliation context, the meaning of 
“reasonable person” is different than the meaning of the same words in 
tort law. In recent years, the Supreme Court has touted the purported 
connection between tort law and discrimination law.193 The Court has 
called Title VII a tort and robustly incorporated tort concepts into 
discrimination and retaliation doctrine.194 If lower courts believe this 
framing device—that discrimination law belongs under the umbrella of 
tort law—it would be natural for those courts to apply tort concepts such 
as the reasonable person construct to discrimination and retaliation law. 
There is one major problem with this application. The reasonable 
person standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Burlington is 
substantively different than tort law’s reasonable person standard. Tort 
law’s reasonable person construct ignores many of the subjective traits of 
the individual, with some well-recognized exceptions. Under tort law, the 
reasonable person standard properly takes into account subjective factors 
such as the wrongdoer’s age and certain physical limitations.195  
However, at least as articulated in many legal opinions, the standard 
does not consider many other characteristics of the wrongdoer, even if 
these traits are arguably relevant to deciding legal culpability. For 
example, tort law does not typically allow a judge or jury to consider a 
wrongdoer’s mental or emotional disability.196 Tort law also does not 
consider whether the wrongdoer was poor, a single mother, or lacked a 
certain level of intelligence.197 Under tort law, these subjective 
circumstances of the wrongdoer generally are irrelevant to the legal 
                                                                                                                     
 191. Moran, supra note 123, at 1234. 
 192. See id. at 1234–38. 
 193. See Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (2014). 
 194. Id. at 1063–68. 
 195. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 9–
11 (2010). 
 196. Id. § 11. 
 197. See id. § 12. 
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inquiry. However, the retaliation doctrine requires that these subjective 
circumstances be taken into account. 
The retaliation reasonable person is radically different for several 
reasons. In tort law, the reasonable person standard inquires into the 
conduct of a wrongdoer to establish whether the wrongdoer breached a 
duty of care.198 In contrast, in retaliation law, courts evaluate the 
perspective of a potential victim, cloaked with some of the individual 
plaintiff’s subjective characteristics and viewed through the lens of an 
objectively reasonable person.199 This inquiry focuses on the level of 
harm that must occur and the underlying goals of retaliation law. 
In tort law, the reasonable person question arises most often in the 
context of negligence.200 In retaliation law, the courts use the reasonable 
person standard to define the level of harm needed to create liability for 
what the courts deem to be intentional conduct.201 In tort law, it is 
sometimes possible to declare, as a matter of law, that certain conduct 
does not create liability because the defendant violated no duty. The court 
must ignore many of the subjective characteristics of the wrongdoer. But, 
this is not the case with retaliation law, where the doctrine expressly calls 
for the court to consider some characteristics of both the victim and the 
workplace in a particular case, at least in some instances.202  
Tort law uses the words “reasonable person” to describe one concept, 
and retaliation law uses those same words to describe a substantively 
different concept. It is easy to see how a court not steeped in the nuances 
of discrimination and tort law might miss these substantive differences. 
In doing so, the court is likely to ignore the subjective elements of a 
particular case. 
The Burlington decision adds another layer of difficulty because the 
legal standard it announced does not clearly align with the goals the Court 
expressed for Title VII’s retaliation provision. Burlington does not 
provide lower courts with clear guidance on when to invoke the worker’s 
subjective circumstances and when to view the harm question purely 
through an objective lens. As discussed earlier, many courts seem to 
ignore Burlington’s language indicating that the worker’s subjective 
circumstances should sometimes play a role.203 One reason courts may 
ignore the subjective analysis is that it does not seem to make sense for 
most cases. 
                                                                                                                     
 198. Id. § 7. 
 199. See Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 375, 446–51 (2010). 
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Courts are not always required to consider the worker’s subjective 
circumstances. For example, if a worker claims her employer fired her 
for complaining about discrimination, courts do not conduct an individual 
analysis to see if the worker’s particular circumstances affected the harm 
inquiry. A termination is always serious enough to create liability. Other 
actions, such as failing to promote or paying a worker less because of a 
discrimination complaint, also fall within that category. There is no 
subjective analysis needed. 
When do the subjective circumstances of the worker start to matter? 
Burlington suggests that a subjective inquiry is required for changes in 
job assignments and is unclear about whether the subjective inquiry is 
required for unpaid suspensions. But, if this is the correct way to read 
Burlington, it makes little sense in actual litigation or in enforcing the 
goals of retaliation law. 
In a large number of cases, the worker will not be able to tell whether 
she faced cognizable retaliation harm until summary judgment or trial. 
She would be required to wait until a judge or a jury weighs all of her 
subjective circumstances. Likewise, the employer will not know whether 
the employer violated the retaliation provision until litigation. The harm 
standard for retaliation law would allow juries to make ad hoc 
determinations about a wide range of conduct in a wide range of 
particular circumstances. 
Further, it is unclear why Burlington asks whether the action would 
dissuade a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s circumstances from 
complaining about discrimination. In most retaliation cases, the plaintiff 
has already complained. He can bring the retaliation claim because he is 
alleging that his complaint led to a negative consequence. 
Adding in the subjective element in these cases makes for a strange 
analysis. It is not clear what a lower court is supposed to do. Is the court 
supposed to pretend to go back in time and imagine whether this 
particular worker would have complained if she had known that a 
particular outcome would occur? Not only does this analysis not make 
sense, it also ignores that part of the power of retaliatory actions is that 
workers do not know the full extent of what might happen to them. 
Burlington does a poor job of explaining how its test navigates the 
purposes of retaliation law. Retaliation law provides an individual 
remedy, but it also does much more. The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
invoked what Professor Richard Moberly refers to as a law enforcement 
rationale for retaliation law.204 Retaliation doctrine exists, in part, to 
protect society’s interest in having its laws enforced.205 It seems odd that 
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society’s interest is met by having the harm threshold depend on an 
individual plaintiff’s subjective circumstances in a wide range of cases.  
V.  BEYOND JUDICIAL MODESTY 
Some possible solutions for dealing with these problems include 
encouraging courts to exercise judicial modesty in undertaking inquiries 
based on the reasonable person standard or encouraging courts to actively 
seek out and consider the perspectives of others.206 These proposals exist 
in other contexts, and they move in the right direction.207 However, they 
are insufficient in the retaliation context.  
Judicial modesty and similar perspective-shifting proposals respond 
to the idea that court opinions capture the view of some, but not all, 
relevant people. This Article, however, suggests that retaliation law’s 
harm standard fails to capture the views of most people. The majority of 
courts do not actually inquire about what a reasonable person would do 
in a particular circumstance because so many courts follow prior cases 
that they consider to be binding. Further, the retaliation harm doctrine is 
so difficult to navigate that the resulting decisions are understandably 
unsatisfying.  
Identifying structural and substantive problems with the retaliation 
harm standard makes it easier to see that structural and substantive 
responses could better align the law with its underlying goals. The 
available evidence shows that court rulings about these underlying 
questions do not align with the articulated purpose of retaliation law. If 
the underlying purpose of retaliation law is to encourage people to 
complain about discrimination, then the current majority rules fail to 
accomplish this for a wide swath of potential retaliatory conduct.  
This Article argues that courts should refrain from navigating the 
harm threshold in these fine-grained ways. Rather, courts should use the 
results of this Article’s study to understand that many negative 
consequences would dissuade reasonable people from complaining about 
discrimination.  
The retaliation harm standard should focus on one goal—separating 
de minimis harm from all other actions. Any negative consequence that 
is more than de minimis should create liability under retaliation law, if 
the worker can meet the other elements of the retaliation claim. For 
actions that would typically be considered de minimis, the worker would 
still have an opportunity to show that in his subjective circumstances, the 
actions caused material harm. In cases with contested facts, the fact finder 
then would determine whether liability exists in the particular case. 
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This Part describes what function the harm threshold should perform. 
It then explores why the de minimis standard better aligns judicial inquiry 
with judicial and procedural competence, with the underlying policy of 
retaliation law, and with broader concerns about judicial credibility and 
consistency. Courts have a special responsibility to care about the 
retaliation harm threshold because the discrimination doctrine they 
created largely contributed to current practices encouraging and 
sometimes requiring workers to complain about discrimination. 
A.  The De Minimis Standard 
As noted above, there are three main inquiries in a retaliation claim: 
whether the worker engaged in protected activity, whether the worker 
suffered an adverse action, and whether there is a causal connection 
between the two. This Section argues for two important shifts in the way 
courts approach the adverse action requirement.  
First, courts should enshrine cautionary language within the 
retaliation harm doctrine warning that the harm standard should not be 
onerous. If the purpose of retaliation law is to prevent actions that would 
dissuade workers from complaining, this Article (as well as some jury 
decisions and judicial opinions) shows that much of the current case law 
sets the standard too high.  
Second, courts should clarify that any action that is more than de 
minimis meets the harm threshold as a matter of law. The courts should 
stop trying to navigate whether non-de minimis harms are cognizable in 
specific circumstances. When a court asks whether the consequence 
would dissuade a reasonable person from filing a discrimination 
complaint, it should assume that most negative consequences would meet 
this threshold.  
Of course, some conduct would qualify as de minimis. In these 
instances, the worker would still have the opportunity to prove that in his 
circumstances, the action caused material harm. Assuming that the 
worker presents evidence supporting a material dispute of fact regarding 
whether the action was de minimis in his particular case, summary 
judgment would be inappropriate on the harm element of the retaliation 
claim. Only in this small subset of de minimis cases should a jury 
determine whether potentially actionable conduct does indeed meet the 
harm threshold given the relevant circumstances in the underlying case. 
Redescribing the harm inquiry in this way comports best with the 
underlying goals of retaliation law. Courts already do this for some 
consequences. For example, if a worker claims that her employer fires 
her because she complained, courts do not determine whether termination 
counts as a harm in the plaintiff’s work environment and in her personal 
circumstances. Courts assume that in all circumstances a termination 
would dissuade a reasonable person from complaining. The results of this 
40
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Article’s survey show that courts should assume that a much wider swath 
of conduct would dissuade a reasonable employee from complaining in 
all circumstances. Therefore, in most cases, courts need not consider the 
subjective characteristics of the individual employee. 
This change does not require the courts to ignore Burlington, but it 
does require some clarification about the way the Supreme Court 
described the underlying inquiry. Ms. White met the harm threshold in 
Burlington because any objective worker would perceive what happened 
to her change in job responsibilities as negative and as being a 
punishment for complaining.208 This is especially true when considering 
both the change in her job responsibilities and the unpaid suspension. 
This finding does not and should not depend on examining Ms. White’s 
particular subjective circumstances. 
However, the Court was correct to worry about providing a list of 
actions that counted as retaliation and actions that would not.209 In 
essence, the Court was worried about the “bad man” problem.210 If it 
provided a list of retaliatory actions and a list of non-retaliatory actions, 
unscrupulous employers or supervisors could protect themselves from 
liability by refraining from the retaliatory actions and punishing 
employees through other “non-retaliatory” actions to cause employees 
distress. This would circumvent the underlying law. 
For example, assume that after a discrimination complaint a 
supervisor changes a worker’s shift to end at 4 p.m. rather than 3 p.m. For 
many workers, this change would be inconsequential and perhaps not 
even a consequence that they consider to be negative. But for some 
workers, such as working parents with children in school, an employer 
might intend this shift change to make the worker’s life harder as a 
punishment for complaining. The Burlington standard recognized that 
these cases should result in liability.  
This approach to the retaliation harm standard is not only most 
consistent with the underlying goals of retaliation law, but it also aligns 
better with the summary judgment standard and with the institutional 
competence of judges and juries. As currently conceived by many lower 
courts, the retaliation harm doctrine asks courts to calibrate a standard 
that accurately reflects all of the current underlying goals of the 
retaliation harm standard for each possible retaliatory action in each 
particular workplace and for each particular worker. As discussed earlier, 
this is substantively difficult given the inherent tension within the 
retaliation doctrine.211  
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Burlington provides no guidance on how courts should determine 
what actions would dissuade an objectively reasonable person from 
complaining about discrimination. There is no available empirical 
research that determines what a reasonable person would think about 
every possible act of retaliation. There is very little empirical evidence 
about retaliation that tests the reasonable person’s response using the 
legal standard enunciated by courts. Additionally, it would be impossible 
for empirical research to calibrate an accurate view of what a reasonable 
person with some of the plaintiff’s characteristics and experiences would 
perceive as retaliatory.  
To date, courts have not had enough empirical data to make fine-
grained determinations about reasonableness. It is tempting to suggest 
that with enough available empirical research, courts should be able to 
perfectly calibrate the retaliation harm standard. Indeed, it may be 
tempting to take the data from this study and make judgments about 
where to specifically draw the harm threshold. However, overly specific 
attempts are misguided and likely to produce unsatisfactory results. 
The U.S. legal system does not currently have a procedural framework 
for incorporating or evaluating empirical evidence in individual cases in 
any systematic way. There is too much uncertainty in the current system 
regarding how courts are to obtain the underlying data needed to evaluate 
what a reasonable person would do in a particular instance, how courts 
are supposed to evaluate available data, and what effect one court’s 
conclusions about the data should have on future cases.212 Further, the 
judicial system does not have a good mechanism for correcting judicial 
findings based on incomplete or incorrect data or for incorporating more 
nuanced data over time. Nor do litigants possess a clear procedural 
mechanism for presenting such data.213 It also is unclear how legal 
standards should respond to changes in the underlying data that might 
naturally occur in the future.  
For all of these reasons, using empirical data in specific cases would 
be difficult. Even assuming that the retaliation harm inquiry can proceed 
without empirical evidence, it is still problematic. When federal trial 
courts consider issues related to the harm standard, they often do so at the 
summary judgment stage. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
permits courts to grant summary judgment only if there is no dispute as 
to any material fact and judgment as a matter of law in the moving party’s 
favor is appropriate.214 Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when 
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a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient basis for ruling in 
favor of the nonmoving party.215  
With the current retaliation harm threshold, it is unclear whether many 
courts are appropriately applying the summary judgment standard. A 
court using a summary judgment record is ill-suited to identify the myriad 
characteristics and circumstances that might affect a reasonable person in 
the employee’s position. These include a whole host of factors, such as 
the person’s age, race, sex, economic vulnerability, and status as the 
family’s primary breadwinner. Further, the court has limited resources to 
determine the severity of the potential action in the context of a particular 
workplace. Returning to the Supreme Court’s example about a lunch 
invitation, it is impossible to tell in the abstract whether a missed lunch 
is trivial or whether lunch is where critical networking occurs.216  
A de minimis standard avoids or diminishes these problems. It 
removes the courts from the tricky business of trying to weigh many 
subjective elements in each retaliation case. In a way, many current courts 
have tried to take the subjective elements out of most determinations, but 
they have done so at the price of making the retaliation harm threshold 
too high. The de minimis standard also takes courts out of the business of 
making fine-grained determinations about how objectively reasonable 
workers would act in a variety of cases by assuming that most negative 
circumstances meet the threshold. Courts trying to place each potential 
kind of retaliatory harm along a spectrum of cognizability face an almost 
impossible task. 
More importantly, the de minimis standard aligns with overarching 
goals of the judicial system, such as credibility and consistency.217 When 
courts rule, as a matter of law, that threatening to fire a worker would not 
dissuade a reasonable person from complaining about discrimination, 
those courts appear disingenuous. Current practice has created an 
inconsistent standard with courts making facially absurd rulings about 
when harm does and does not occur. 
Some might argue that the reasonable person standard is a corrective, 
rhetorical device designed to get courts to consider harm from a potential 
victim’s perspective. This perspective-forcing element is the goal of the 
rhetorical device, and it is simply irrelevant whether the law actually 
approximates the view of any real people. That view of the reasonable 
person inquiry makes the inquiry even more opaque in the retaliation 
context and makes it impossible to determine what the court is supposed 
to accomplish when making the harm determination. The de minimis 
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standard better aligns judicial inquiry, judicial and procedural 
competence, the underlying policy of retaliation law, and broader 
concerns about judicial credibility and consistency.  
B.  The Courts’ Special Responsibility 
Courts bear a special responsibility in correctly navigating the 
difference between cognizable and non-actionable harms given their role 
in requiring and incentivizing employees to complain about 
discrimination. Courts have created a discrimination jurisprudence that 
relies heavily on workers complaining about ongoing discrimination. 
Creating a system that requires or encourages employees to complain but 
that does not protect them when they do is simply unfair. Further, the 
unfairness is even more pronounced when courts ensconce the harm 
threshold in the language of when a reasonable person would perceive 
harm. 
The discrimination statutes themselves and the courts’ interpretations 
of them require and incentivize complaints. In all cases, workers must 
formally invoke the administrative process.218 To bring a successful 
discrimination or retaliation claim, the worker must first file a charge of 
discrimination with the EEOC or a comparable state agency.219 If the 
worker does not do this, the worker cannot successfully pursue his claim. 
In some cases, the worker still works for the employer when he files the 
charge of discrimination.220  
If the EEOC or state agency investigates the worker’s allegations, the 
worker who filed the charge must participate in the investigation.221 The 
administrative agency may interview other employees at the workplace 
or ask them to provide statements about the allegations.222 The employer 
may also conduct a separate, internal investigation into the allegations, 
interviewing the complaining worker or other employees.223 A legal 
doctrine that forces workers to invoke an administrative process or to 
cooperate in subsequent investigations should protect workers who 
comply.  
Under the current majority view, an employer could legally threaten 
to fire a worker, place negative evaluations in the worker’s file, or engage 
in other negative conduct because of the worker’s participation in these 
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formal processes. Applying this harm doctrine, the courts would not 
define what happened to the worker as retaliation, even if the employer 
acted because of the participation in the formal process. 
In some cases, court-created doctrine requires employees to complain 
internally to their employer to later bring a successful claim. When the 
Supreme Court decided that a worker could bring a claim for sexual 
harassment under Title VII, the Court noted that the employer would not 
always be liable for the harassment.224 In two subsequent cases, the Court 
developed rules that require employees, in certain instances, to complain 
to their employer about harassment.225 If the employee fails to complain, 
she is unable to prevail on her harassment claim, even if she can show 
that the employer harassed her.226 
The Court held that employers are automatically liable for harassment 
if an employee’s supervisor takes a tangible employment action against 
the employee.227 In other instances, the employer may still face liability, 
but the employer has an available affirmative defense to escape 
liability.228 The employer must establish that it “exercised reasonable care 
to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior” and that 
the worker “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or 
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm 
otherwise.”229 
When creating this affirmative defense, the Court imported a policy 
goal for Title VII that is not explicitly enshrined in the statute. The Court 
stated that “Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of 
antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms.”230 The 
Court also imported into Title VII the idea of avoidable consequences—
that employees should try to avoid litigation and provide employers with 
an opportunity to remedy harassment without litigation.231 The Court also 
drew on the idea of deterrence, arguing that the law should encourage 
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If a worker does not complain about harassment or if he fails to 
participate in an employer’s investigation of his harassment claim, his 
harassment claim may fail in court.233 These employer protections are not 
limited to the harassment context. Employers can also use the existence 
of complaint and investigation procedures to avoid punitive damages.234 
These court-created doctrines provide employers with a legal 
incentive to create complaint procedures, to publicize the procedures to 
employees, and to encourage employee complaints. Many employers 
have policies that encourage employees to complain about actions that 
may not even be cognizable under the federal discrimination statutes or 
that the employee may not need to first report to the employer under 
federal law.235  
Not only did the courts enshrine complaint procedures as an important 
part of discrimination law, they also placed retaliation law at the center 
of discrimination enforcement. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated 
that “Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the cooperation of 
employees who are willing to file complaints and act as witnesses.”236 
The Court has also stated that “the leading reason” that workers do not 
complain about discrimination is the “[f]ear of retaliation.”237 
Under the current system, workers must complain in certain 
circumstances to later maintain a cognizable harassment claim.238 In these 
and other cases, workers are told that it is preferable to complain because 
this provides the employer the opportunity to fix problems without 
litigation.239 The discrimination statutes provide that employers shall not 
discriminate against these workers for complaining about discrimination, 
and case law nominally invokes a protective reasonable person standard.  
This entire structure is undermined by a growing body of case law that 
defines the reasonable person unreasonably. Given the courts’ role in 
creating the complaint apparatus, the courts have a special responsibility 
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C.  Floodgates of Litigation? 
The de minimis standard does not mean that plaintiffs will always be 
able to survive summary judgment or that workers will always win 
retaliation cases.240 Several structural features of retaliation law limit 
claims. Focusing on de minimis harms may place greater pressure on 
other elements of the retaliation inquiry, especially the causation element.  
The federal discrimination statutes already contain numerous 
procedural and substantive provisions that limit potential claims. Before 
filing suit in court, plaintiffs must file a charge of discrimination with the 
EEOC or state agency within a specified time period, and then they must 
file the lawsuit within a specified time period.241 Plaintiffs typically must 
file a charge within either 180 or 300 days from the discriminatory act 
and must file their claim in court within 90 days of receiving a right to 
sue letter.242 If a plaintiff does not file the charge or lawsuit within the 
required period, the claim is usually barred.243  
The administrative process is ostensibly designed to reduce the 
number of claims that make it to court. The EEOC or state agency 
sometimes operates in an advisory role, advising workers about the scope 
of the discrimination statutes.244 Sometimes potential claimants realize 
that they have no claim after speaking with employees from the 
administrative agency. The EEOC or the state agency also mediates 
claims, sometimes after finding that the employer likely engaged in 
inappropriate conduct and sometimes through voluntary mediation 
between the parties.245 Administrative agencies may also find that there 
is no reasonable cause for the claim.246  
Other statutory provisions also limit the number of claims. Title VII 
plaintiffs may only bring claims against employers who employ at least 
fifteen employees.247 Additionally, the person bringing the claim must be 
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an individual that falls within the statutory protections, such as an 
employee or former employee.248  
Congress also limited the relief available to employees under Title 
VII. The total combined compensatory and punitive damages a plaintiff 
may recover under Title VII is dependent upon the number of employees 
employed by the defendant.249 The highest cap, which applies to 
employers with more than 500 employees, is $300,000.250 The statute 
also explicitly defines the type of compensatory damages available.251  
Substantive retaliation doctrine also contains limits. The worker must 
establish that she engaged in protected activity.252 The statute defines the 
protected activity as falling into one of two categories: opposition 
conduct and participation conduct.253 Most conduct that falls within the 
participation prong involves some formal type of conduct, such as 
submitting a charge of discrimination to the EEOC, participating in an 
EEOC investigation, or testifying as part of court proceedings.254 As 
argued above, it seems especially unfair for the law to not recognize harm 
if the worker formally invokes the federal statute’s administrative or court 
process and is subjected to negative actions because of this activity. 
The courts place additional restrictions on opposition conduct. 
Opposition conduct typically refers to internal complaints to the 
employer.255 Such conduct must be reasonable in its form and must be 
reasonably interpreted as complaining about discrimination.256 For 
example, an employee cannot hit his supervisor and claim that he was 
complaining about discrimination. The worker also must have a 
reasonable belief that what he is complaining about constitutes legal 
discrimination.257 
Most importantly, the Supreme Court recently heightened the causal 
standard in Title VII retaliation cases. To prevail, a worker must establish 
that her protected activity was a “but for” cause of the adverse action.258 
This means that plaintiffs in Title VII retaliation cases must establish a 
higher level of causation than plaintiffs in Title VII discrimination cases. 
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The de minimis standard will likely place more pressure on the 
causation element of retaliation claims. In some of the adverse action 
cases, the court seems to be concerned about whether the worker can 
establish causation—the required link between the protected activity and 
the adverse action. In fact, Professor Brake has argued that courts have 
unnecessarily construed the protected activity element of retaliation cases 
narrowly in cases where the real concern appears to be causation.259 This 
same phenomenon happens in adverse action cases. 
Recalibrating the current understanding of the retaliation standard 
does not mean that plaintiffs will start winning cases involving trivial 
harms. Courts will still have the ability to rule as a matter of law that 
trivial harms are non-cognizable, subject to the worker’s ability to show 
that in her particular circumstances the action was not de minimis. When 
fact questions remain in these cases, juries can still determine that harm 
within a specific context was not material.  
CONCLUSION 
As currently framed, the retaliation harm standard is problematic. It is 
ostensibly designed to prohibit actions that would dissuade a reasonable 
person from complaining about discrimination. Yet, the results of this 
Article’s study show that the current case law does not align with this 
goal. This Article’s study results also point to an inherent tension within 
existing retaliation doctrine. Current retaliation law contains two 
different strands: one that uses the harm standard to further the goals of 
retaliation law and another that uses harm doctrine to limit the scope of 
retaliation claims. Survey participants did not view these two threads as 
coterminous. 
The standard appears to contemplate that courts make fine-grained 
determinations about whether workers suffered harm, taking into account 
the subjective circumstances of both the worker and the work 
environment. The resulting case law shows that courts have difficulty 
navigating this complex doctrine. If courts have consistent difficulty in 
navigating these questions, perhaps the law should not require them to do 
so. The de minimis standard better aligns retaliation harm doctrine with 
the purposes of retaliation law. 
Most importantly, this Article raises questions about whether bias 
explains case outcomes in the retaliation context. Additionally, it has 
implications for sexual harassment law, which also relies on a reasonable 
person standard to assess harm.260 To constitute sexual harassment, the 
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employee must face actions that are severe or pervasive enough to affect 
the terms and conditions of employment from the perspective of an 
objectively reasonable person. Academic critiques of the outcomes in 
sexual harassment cases complain that the objectively reasonable person 
standard actually enshrines a male view of workplace harm.261 The 
empirical work in this Article provides an important potential challenge 
to this critique. Sexual harassment law may fail to represent the views of 
both men and women. If this is the case, it raises important questions 
about the role and implications of the reasonable person standard. 
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